From proximity to distant banking : spanish banks in the EMU by Martín Oliver, Alfredo
From Proximity to Distant 
Banking: sPanish Banks  
in the emU 
Alfredo Martín-Oliver
Documentos de trabajo 
n.º 1008
2010
FROM PROXIMITY TO DISTANT BANKING: SPANISH BANKS IN THE EMU 
 FROM PROXIMITY TO DISTANT BANKING: SPANISH BANKS  
IN THE EMU (*) 
Alfredo Martín-Oliver (**) 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 
 
 
 
 
(*) This paper is the sole responsibility of its author and the views represented here do not necessarily reflect those of the 
Banco de España. I am grateful to Vicente Salas for guidance and insights and to Javier Mencía and Jesús Saurina for 
their helpful comments. This paper has also benefited from the comments of the participants in the 7th International 
Industrial Organization Conference, 36th EARIE conference and EFMA Meeting in 2009. 
(**) Address for correspondence: Alfredo Martín-Oliver; Alcalá 48, 28014 Madrid, Spain. Tel.: + 34 91 338 6178;  
e-mail: alfredo.martin@bde.es. 
 
 
Documentos de Trabajo. N.º 1008 
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and finance. All papers 
have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España aims to contribute 
to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy and its international 
environment. 
 
The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, 
therefore, do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. 
 
 
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the INTERNET at the 
following website: http://www.bde.es. 
 
 
 
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is 
acknowledged. 
 
© BANCO DE ESPAÑA, Madrid, 2010 
 
ISSN: 0213-2710 (print) 
ISSN: 1579-8666 (on line) 
Depósito legal: M. 14141-2010      
Unidad de Publicaciones, Banco de España
Abstract 
This paper examines the nature of competition in the Spanish banking industry during the 
years before and after Spain joined the European Monetary Union (EMU). The paper models 
competition in a product-differentiated market where banks choose from a list of price 
(interest rates of loans and deposits) and non-price variables (branches, advertising, 
IT capital). The empirically estimated demand and cost functions are used to simulate the 
values of the endogenous variables of the representative bank in response to the historically 
low official interest rates of the post Euro period. The results show that there has been a 
convergence in the levels of price competition in the loans and deposits markets during the 
post Euro period. Additionally, the paper finds that branches have lost weight in the mix of 
competition variables in benefit of advertising and IT capital. This is interpreted as evidence 
that traditional proximity banking is evolving towards distant banking. Finally, the simulation 
results highlight the high imbalances between loans and deposits for the representative bank 
in the regime of low official interest rates of the Euro zone. 
Keywords: banking competition; product differentiation; intangibles; simulation. 
JEL codes: G21, D24. 
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1 Introduction 
One of the most visible consequences for Spain of joining the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) was the relaxation of the monetary conditions. As a result, the interbank interest rate 
fell from an average of 11.75% to 3.93% during the eight years prior and after the integration, 
respectively. Coinciding with the new monetary conditions, Spanish banks expanded the 
volume of credit at a higher rate than the volume of deposits and relied on the money markets 
(including the interbank market) to close the gap. Another less visible change in the Spanish 
banking industry during the post Euro period has been the evolution of the mix of competition 
variables. In this respect, the Information Technology capital (advertising capital) per branch 
has risen from a median of 68.84 (13.1) thousands Euros at constant 1983 prices in the 
1988-1996 pre Euro period to 85.23 (14.1) thousands Euros in the 1997-2003 period. 
Additionally, the density of branches decreased from 0.94 in 1997 (when Spain was about to 
join the Euro) to 0.92 in 2003. The purpose of this paper is to examine the response of the 
Spanish banks to the new monetary conditions created by the Euro and to the developments 
in the banking technology and in the consumers’ behaviour, taking advantage of a rich 
database on expenditures in advertising and IT capital at bank level. The analysis will answer 
to what extent distant banking might be substituting proximity banking around a dense 
branching network, in Spain and elsewhere. 
The theoretical part of the paper models the behaviour of banks that operate in 
product-differentiated markets of loans and deposits and it assumes that each bank makes 
competition decisions in price (interest rates) and non-price [advertising, information 
technology (IT) and branches] variables. On the demand side, the paper assumes that banks’ 
services are differentiated and that customers choose the bank as a utility-maximizing, 
discrete-choice problem. Consumers’ decisions are determined by three differentiating, 
observable attributes: price (interest rate for loans and deposits), advertising capital and 
physical capital from the investment in branches. The derivation of the demand functions is 
based on Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995), that provided the methodology to estimate 
demand functions that result from discrete consumer choices using market share data. 
On the supply side, loans and deposits are jointly produced with two variable inputs, the 
combination of labour and services from IT capital, and one quasi-fixed input, the size of 
the branch [Martín-Oliver and Salas-Fumás (2008)]. Then, a Nash equilibrium solution is 
obtained for each and all of the decision variables. 
The empirical part of the paper presents the estimates of the parameters of the 
production function and of the market demand functions for loans and deposits obtained for 
data of Spanish banks during the period 1988-2003. One relevant feature of our data is that 
the interest rates of loans and deposits used in the estimation are those charged by banks 
in the current time period (year) and not the average of past and present interest rates, as it 
has been the case in previous research. Finally, the estimated parameters and functional 
forms are used to simulate the optimal response of the representative bank in the choice of 
interest rates and other non-price competition variables in order to respond to changes of the 
exogenous variables of the model. The different scenarios might simulate a change in 
the monetary policy (that affects the official interest rate) or the tightening of the credit 
conditions in the money markets (that increases the price of equity), as it has been the case in 
the recent crisis. 
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Competition in retail banking has been widely investigated in both, the traditional 
structure-performance paradigm and in the new behavioural approaches.1 Among  papers 
that study banking competition in product-differentiated markets, some consider only price 
competition in either the deposits [Hannan and Berger (1991)] or in the loans market 
[Scholnick (1999), Jaumandreu and Lourences (2002), Dell’ Ariccia (2001)]; others only 
non-price competition [Kim and Vale (2001), analyze the number of branches]; and others 
model both competition on price and non-price variables [Pinho (2000); on price, advertising 
and branches in deposits markets; Carbó et al. (2005), on price and number of branches in 
loans and deposits markets]. However, the analysis of banking competition under the lens 
of product heterogeneity and price and non-price competition has not received as much 
attention as in other industries. The common factor of the papers in banking is that 
they based their analysis on (ad hoc) demand functions that are not derived from a buyers’ 
behavioural model or require of strong assumptions to reduce the number of substitution 
parameters across products or firms that are to be estimated2
Only recently there have been papers that model the demand of banking services 
as a discrete choice of consumers [Adams (2007), Knittel and Stango (2008), Dick (2008), 
Ishii (2005), Ho (2010)]
. In contrast, this paper 
postulates demand functions for loans and deposits derived from multiple choice decisions 
by bank customers and expands the list of decision variables of banks to jointly include 
IT capital, advertising capital and number of branches, in addition to interest rates. 
3
The sample period is divided in two sub-periods, 1988-1996 and 1997-2003 that 
corresponds to the years before and after Spain prepared and actually became a full member 
of the EMU. The model is then estimated for each sub-period to test for the stability of the 
structural parameters of the model that determine the profits of banks and, consequently, 
the level of effective competition in each sub-period. The empirical model to be estimated 
consists on a system of simultaneous equations of demand and cost functions, together 
. However, none of these papers uses marginal interest rates to 
estimate price elasticities and they do not model price and non-price competition with such 
a wide range of decision variables in both the loans and the deposits markets as it is done 
in this paper. In addition, the paper jointly estimates the parameters of the cost function 
of banks together with the parameters of the demand function and the first order 
equilibrium conditions. Therefore, the parameters of the cost function are estimated under the 
double condition that the estimated cost function fits the data on total operating costs of 
the bank and that the marginal revenue has to be equal to the marginal cost. Previous 
research either estimates the cost function separated from the demand and first order 
conditions [Carbó (2005)], or estimates the parameters of cost only considering the condition 
of marginal cost equal to marginal revenue [Ho (2010); Ishii (2005)]. 
                                                                            
1. Smirlock et al.(1984), Rhoades (1985), Berger and Hannan (1989), Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) are some 
representative papers that focus on the Structure-Performance and estimate the relation between bank profits 
and market concentration among other explanatory variables. The New Empirical Industrial Organization approach 
[Bresnahan (1989)], inspires the work on market power of banks by Molyneux et al. (1994), Claessens and 
Laeven (2004) who measure market power from the estimate of the H statistic of Panzar-Rosse. Shaffer (1993), on the 
other hand, measure market power of US and Canadian banks from the estimate of the mark-up proposed 
by Bresnahan and Lau (1982). Martin-Oliver et al. (2006) provide measures of market power from the calculation of 
the Lerner index of individual banks. These empirical models do not postulate a full competition model with price and 
non-price competition variables. 
2. Bresnahan (1989) and Berry (1994) document that in product-differentiated frameworks the number of cross-effects 
to be estimated, increases at a larger pace than the number of firms. 
3. Research from non banking industries includes Besanko et al.(1998) who estimate a logit demand equations for the 
markets of catsup and yogurt in the US; Villas-Boas and Winer (1999) consider the introduction of brand choice also in 
the catsup and yogurt markets; Nevo (2001) measures the level of market power in the ready-to-eat cereal industry; 
Petrin (2002) quantifies the consumer welfare benefits from the introduction of new products. Barroso (2008) evaluates 
the dynamic effect of the increasing demand of a new product as the consumers become aware of its existence. 
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with the profit-maximizing conditions for each competition variable that determine the 
Nash equilibrium solution of the industry [Besanko et al. (1998); Chintagunta et al. (2006)]. 
The system is estimated with the non-linear GMM estimator using instruments to take care 
of the potential endogeneity of interest rates in the estimation of the demand of banking 
products. 
The results show that Spanish banks had market power during the whole sample 
period in both loan and deposit markets (demand functions of loans and deposits are price 
inelastic). Market power of banks can be explained in part by the product differentiation 
effects induced by advertising capital and the network of branches. The incorporation of 
Spain into the EMU changed the competitive conditions of the banking industry: the absolute 
value of the price elasticity increased in deposits and decreased in loans. As a result, 
the market power of banks in loans became higher than in deposits. In the second part of the 
sample period the marginal return from advertising capital (branches) is higher (lower) 
than in the first part of the period, what suggests a translation from a banking based on 
proximity to a distant banking, where assets such as IT or advertising increase their weight 
in the competition mix at the expense of branches. 
The simulation exercise of changes in the monetary conditions reveals that a 
decrease in the interbank interest rate raises the contribution of loans to total profits and 
lowers the contribution of deposits. The results of the simulation also show that a fall in the 
interbank rate generates a gap between the balance of loans and deposits that is consistent 
with the gap observed in Spanish banks in recent years of unusually low interbank rates, 
a gap that had to be filled with market-supplied funds. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic theoretical 
model of the profit-maximizing bank. Section 3 contains a description of the database 
and the methodology applied in the estimations. Section 4 presents the results of the 
estimation of the model and simulations and robustness tests. Finally, Section 5 presents 
the conclusions that summarize the main results of the paper. 
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2 The model 
2.1 Consumer behavior 
The model assumes that the buyers’ relation with banks extends to two different products: 
loans and deposits. Consumers choose a single bank for each of these two products 
and their choice is based on a utility-maximizing, discrete-choice problem that takes 
into account the different observable attributes of banks. The theoretical setup assumes that 
the choice of the bank for loans and deposits is made separately (no grouping of products) 
and at every point in time (without taking into account prior relationships), though the 
empirical estimation will consider potential correlations across choices. In this way, our 
framework for the demand functions will be at least as good as those papers that consider 
only one output component, but with some advantages such as the consideration of both 
output components in the cost equation and the joint estimation of all the demand and cost 
functions, which will be later analyzed in more detail. 
The derivation of the demand functions is based on Berry (1994) and Berry 
et al. (1995) that provided the methodology to estimate demand functions that result from 
discrete consumer choices using market share data. Consumers choose among all the 
banks to obtain loans, deposits (and possibly other services) in a utility-maximizing way, 
where utility is a function of price (decreasing) and also a function of the stock of advertising 
capital (increasing) and of the number of branches (also increasing). Then, under certain 
assumptions4, [Berry (1994)] the aggregated demand functions of each output component 
faced by banks can be written as the log of its market share (logit functions)5
 
: 
 iiii pxss ξαβ +−=− 0lnln  (1) 
 
where si is the market share of bank i with respect to the size of the potential market M; s0 is 
the proportion of the total consumers that does not buy any product (outside good); pi is the 
price (interest rate) quoted by the bank, xi is a vector of observable attributes of bank i that 
increase the consumers’ utility observable (basically, number of branches and advertising 
capital) and iξ stands for the unobservable characteristics of bank i. The advantage of 
allowing for an “outside good” is that consumers are not forced to choose from the one of the 
alternative banks so demand will not depend on the difference of prices across alternatives, 
but on the levels themselves [Berry (1994)]. In this way, a generalized increase in the prices 
of all the firms is consistent with a fall of the total demand because a proportion of consumers 
prefer to purchase the outside good (not to buy). In the case of loans and deposits, 
the outside good will refer to sources of funds or investment opportunities that consumers 
                                                                            
4. The assumptions are: i) no random coefficients (β is constant across costumers); ii) the distribution of consumer 
preferences identically and independently distributed across products and consumers with the extreme value distribution 
function; and iii) mean utility of the outside good normalized to zero. 
5. There has been advances in the IO literature [Berry et al. (1995)] that aim to relax the cross elasticity patterns 
derived from the logit model that imply that products are differentiated only through their mean utility levels. The use of 
nested logits or random coefficient models aim to allow for interactions between product and consumer characteristics 
so as to avoid that, for instance in the car market, a luxury car and a subcompact car do have the same cross-elasticity 
with a third car if they have the same market shares. This paper assumes that elasticities do not vary depending 
on potential groups that could be identified, though it has been considered in previous papers on banking (listed versus 
non-listed banks (Ho, 2010); multi-state banks versus banks that operate in a single state [Dick (2008)]; thrifts 
versus banks [Adams (2007)]. 
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can find out of the banking markets. From these demand equations, the price (e) and 
non-price (Σ) elasticity are: 
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2.2 Banks’ production and profit-maximizing conditions 
The basic modelling for the production function of banks is taken from Martín-Oliver and 
Salas-Fumás (2008) with some extensions. The activity of banks consists on granting loans, 
L, and the collection of deposits, D. In their activity, banks deploy four different types of 
resources: labor (N), IT capital (IK), branches (B) and advertising capital (CK). Banks finance 
their loans and operating capital stocks with equity (E), deposits (D) and the balances 
borrowed / lent in the interbank market (BO, positive or negative). The balancing equilibrium 
constraints are formulated as follows: 
EDBOLCKpIKpKp CKIKK ++=+++  (3) 
aLCKpIKpKpE CKIKK +++=  (4) 
where pKK=Bkb, being kb  the euros invested per branch , B is the number of branches and 
pK, pIK, pCK are the market purchase prices of one unit of service from the respective capital 
asset. Equation (3) assures that total assets are equal to total liabilities. Equation (4) assumes 
that the amount of equity for the representative bank is equal to the amount invested in 
operating assets plus a fixed positive proportion a of the stock of loans determined by the 
regulatory framework or exogenously set by the bank above the minimum regulatory 
requirements6
Banks operate in a product-differentiated market and offer a bundle of two different 
outputs, Loans and Deposits. Bank i faces a demand function for each output component at 
year t, Lit (rtl; Bt, CKt), Dit(rtd;Bt, CKt) that depends on the vector of interest rates quoted by 
the bank i ant its competitors and on the vector of the number of branches and advertising 
capital of bank i and its competitors. More concretely, the demand of loans depends 
negatively (positively) on the interest rate charged by the bank (the competitors) and 
the demand of deposits increases (decreases) as the own (competitors’) interest rate also 
increases. On the other hand, we consider that banks deploy Advertising Capital (CK) 
and Branches B) as value-enhancing components of the demand that aim at increasing the 
final value of the banks’ product, so the demand of loans and deposits both increase 
(decrease) with the own (competitors’) stock of each value-enhancing asset.
. 
7
                                                                            
6. Equation (4) could be formulated assuming that regulatory capital is set equal to a proportion of the total assets 
(loans plus tangible and intangible assets) of the bank, i.e. 8% according to Basel I. This would imply that the financial 
opportunity cost of tangible and intangible assets will be equal to the weighted average financial cost of interbank 
finance and equity finance, but the basic model would not change.  The equation is written as equality because the cost 
of equity is higher than the interbank rate; thus, in the optimal solution, banks will choose the minimum equity required. 
 
7. This assumption is in line with the findings of Martín-Oliver and Salas-Fumás (2008). They classify the resources 
depending on how they contribute to the generation of value differentiating between inputs (increase the production) 
and value-enhancing resources (increase demand). They find that IT capital, Labor and the physical space provided by 
branches are inputs of the banks’ production function and that the number of branches and advertising capital 
are value-enhancing resources.  
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On the production side, we follow Martín-Oliver and Salas-Fumás (2008) and assume 
that the banks’ output is produced under a Leontieff production function that combines the 
services of two set of inputs: on the one hand, the services from labour and services from IT 
capital and, on the other hand, the services of a quasi-fixed input, the physical space of 
the branch. The space of the branch does not limit the volume of operation and the 
production is done under constant returns to scale in labour and IT capital. Under these 
assumptions, empirically validated in Martin-Oliver and Salas-Fumás (2008), the total output 
of the bank can be written as the product of the output per branch times the number of 
branches. In this paper it is assumed that the aggregate output of the bank can be expressed 
as a weighted product of Loans and Deposits, so the production function will be written as, 
 
( )IKNFDLOutput 21 zz ,==  (5) 
 
where z1, z2 are the exponential weights to be empirically determined. 
Banks pay market prices and opportunity costs for the inputs used in production. 
The interbank market interest rate is given by rib, while the cost of equity financing is given 
by oc , that we assume to be greater than the interbank rate to account for a positive 
risk premium asked by the shareholders. The market salary that compensates workers is w 
and the user’s costs of capital (financial opportunity cost plus depreciation) for each asset 
of the bank are given by cK, cIK,, cCK, for physical, IT and advertising capital, respectively. 
Taking into account (3), (4) and (5) and the rest of assumptions listed above, we can 
write the expression of banks profits. The model will assume that the interbank market allows 
banks to separate loans from deposits in the problem of banks. Then, each bank is assumed 
to maximize its profits with respect to prices, production inputs and demand-enhancing 
resources: 
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Banks obtain gross margins from loans and deposits. For loans, the unit gross margin, 
is the difference between the interest charged by the bank, litr , minus the opportunity unit 
cost of lending it
o
it
ib
tit rpcaarm +⋅+−= )1( . The opportunity unit cost of lending includes 
the cost of regulatory equity (each Euro of loans consumes a units of bank’s equity that 
costs cit0); the cost from the interbank market, rtib(1-a); and finally an ex-ante estimate 
of the credit risk of the loan8
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 21it  ,,IT zditzditditditit DLDLGNF ==
, rpit. Super-index d in L, D stands for demand function. 
Net economic profits are equal to the gross profits minus the operating capital and labor 
costs. These profits are maximized subject to the production technology with multiple outputs 
 in (5). 
                                                                            
8. The calculation of the ex-ante credit risk is explained in Section 3. 
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The profit maximization problem has an embedded cost minimizing problem linked 
to the costs of the inputs that enter into the production function9
 
. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas 
aggregation function for inputs in the production function, the cost problem has the form: 
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where Cit stands for the total operating costs and κ, 1− κ, are the elasticity of the total 
output to the IT capital and labour inputs, respectively, under the assumption of constant 
returns to scale in the production function [in line with the findings in Martín-Oliver and 
Salas-Fumás (2008)]. The resulting dual cost function that represents the total operating costs 
of the bank depends on the output produced and on the price of the resources deployed 
as follows10,11
 
: 
( ) ititititIKit DzLzwcC lnlnln1lnln 21,0 ++−++= κκκ  (6) 
 
And the profit maximizing model is modified to 
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The First Order Conditions (FOC) obtained from the maximization with respect to 
interest rates, branches and advertising capital define the necessary conditions for the Nash 
equilibrium solution of the game. The FOC with respect to the loan and deposit interest rates 
or price equations are12,13
                                                                            
9. The number of branches are not included in the cost-minimization problem in spite of being also production inputs 
because, once the total number of workers and the amount of IT capital are chosen, the number of branches are 
determined straightforward because of the Leontieff production technology. 
: 
10. Note that the sum of the z’s does not necessary adds up to 1, since we only impose constant returns to scale at the 
input level, without imposing further restrictions to the combination of loans, deposits and commissions that make up 
the output. 
11. It could be argued that a translog cost function or the Fourier functional form constitute a better fit to the actual 
operating costs. However, we prefer this expression since we intend to obtain sharp effects of every variable on costs to 
relate them with the rest of equations in the system, and the high number of parameters to be estimated in the translog 
form (exponentially increasing with the number of inputs and outputs) results in sometimes less precise estimates of the 
input and output effects. 
12. Appendix A presents the analytical derivation of the FOC. 
13. The price equations in (7) can be easily rearranged to obtain the well-known result 
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, that is, the net relative profit margin (the so-called Lerner index) is equal to 
the inverse of the absolute value of the price elasticity. 
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where el and ed are the price elasticity of the demand of loans and the demand of deposits; 
it
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∂ , are the marginal operating costs of loans and deposits, which under the 
assumptions of the model are equal to 
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Cz ⋅2 . The second set of optimality 
conditions refer to profit maximizing conditions for advertising capital (CK) and number 
of branches (B)  (i.e. the value-enhancing inputs that enter into the demand function) 
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where dl
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d
itit
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l
it
l vv  DrLr
Lrv −=
+
= 1; ; ΣJ,R is the elasticity of output demand J with respect to 
K and el, ed are the price-elasticity of loan and deposit demands. 
These FOC conditions on the optimal advertising and branch capital coincide 
with those from the well-known Dorfman-Steiner (1954) conditions (originally formulated 
for advertising expenditures). Equations (8) and (9) imply that it is optimal for a bank to 
increase their assets deployed up to the point where the user’s cost of the advertising 
capital / number of branches (marginal cost) is equal to the respective marginal revenue 
generated from such expenditures for a given price. The marginal revenue, in turn, is equal to 
the weighted average of the absolute margin obtained for every unit of additional output in 
loans and deposits times the elasticity of the demand of the respective output component 
to the stock of advertising / number of branches. For both loans and deposits, the profit 
margin per unit of output is equal to the inverse of the price elasticity [equation (7)], when all 
variables evaluated at the optimal values. The weights are the contribution of each output 
component to the total income. 
Notice that the model assumes that banks set the optimal level of branches and 
advertising capital at the same time as prices. Therefore, the model does not contemplate 
dynamics in the decision of which is the optimal number branches and stock of advertising 
capital. In this framework, (8) and (9) have to be interpreted as the conditions that maximize 
the profits of the bank in the long run, that is, once all the adjustment costs necessary to 
move from one equilibrium to the next have been satisfied. 
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3 Data sample and estimation methodology 
3.1 Database 
The database used for the empirical analysis comes from the population of Spanish 
commercial and savings banks in the period 1988 to 2003. We have a sample of 200 different 
banks that represent 95% of the assets of Spanish banking system; the rest belong to the 
credit cooperatives, for which most of the data needed are not available, and to small banks 
with a proportion of assets smaller than 0.1% of the system. The raw data from accounting 
statements of banks have been transformed to obtain an estimate of the replacement cost 
of the book valued assets. A systematic methodology is applied to obtain the user cost of 
capital for each asset and bank over time. Martín-Oliver, Salas and Saurina (2007) provide 
a detailed description of how the variables used in this analysis have been constructed; 
we present a summary of the methodology in Appendix B. 
This paper also uses data on total operating economic costs of banks that will 
be used for the estimation of the parameters of the production function (from duality). 
The information on prices is obtained from the data of marginal interest rates of loans and 
deposits made during every year. Most often, the only data available for researchers are the 
ratios between the flows of revenues or interest payments from the income statement and 
the stock of accounts reported in the balance sheet. As opposed to this, the interest rate data 
used in this paper are actual interest rates charged by the bank in the new operations made 
during every year. Finally, the paper also uses data on the credit risk of loans from the 
Spanish Credit Register to construct the risk premium that is a part of the marginal cost of 
loans. The risk premium is estimated as a function of the probability of default of the banks’ 
loans times the estimated average loss given default [see Martín-Oliver et al. (2006)]. In the 
model, banks are assumed to estimate the risk premium for loans granted at every year t 
using standard time series econometric techniques and all the information available from 
1986 (first year of information of the Credit Register) until t. We assume that regulatory 
requirements imply that banks need 8% of equity for each euro of total assets, so we set 
a =0.08. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the two components of banks’ output, 
i.e. loans and deposits at constant Euros of 1983. We observe that the number of banks has 
decreased during the sample period from 151 in 1988 to 80 in 2003, mainly due to mergers 
and acquisitions. In the empirical estimations, banks that result from a merge are considered 
as new entities. The outstanding amount of loans has been multiplied by 3 during the period, 
increasing at an average annual rate of 8.58% and 15.80% in the 1988-1996 and 1997-2003 
time periods, respectively. The balance of deposits has also increased but at a smaller 
pace (average growth rate of 8.32% in 1988-1996 and 12.56% in 1997-2003); therefore 
the increase of the loan activity has been funded through other sources than deposits 
(bonds, securitizations, ..,). Differences in growth rates for each output have modified the 
output mix of the banks over time from 40.1% of loans and 59.9% of deposits in 1988, 
to 47.9% and 52.1%, in 2003, respectively. Table 1 also presents the descriptive statistics of 
the market share of loans and deposits computed with respect to the potential market, whose 
definition is explained in Section 3.2.1. 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables that will 
be used in the analysis for the two time periods that will be separately estimated, 1988-1996 
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and 1997-2003. The average bank has managed to increase its size in all the resources 
deployed in their activity: number of workers (31.9% more in 1997-2003 than in 1988-1996), 
number of branches (234 in the first period and 359 in the second), IT capital (the stock 
of this input more than doubled) and Advertising capital (43.82% of growth between the 
two periods). On the other hand, the total operating costs have also increased (78.9% of 
growth between 1988-1996 and 1997-2003) mainly due to the larger bank size and the wider 
amount of resources deployed, as the input prices have been kept either constant (wages) 
or have decreased (user cost of capital). Finally, the interest rates of loans and deposits have 
also dropped due to the fall in the interbank rate that is the reference for these markets. 
Nonetheless, part of the drop of loan interest rates is due to the fall of the risk premium 
embedded in the price of loans (average yearly growth of -0.59% in the first period 
and of -7.67% in the second period) that can be attributed to better screening and monitoring 
of borrowers, as well as improvements in risk measurement and management. 
3.2 Empirical model and estimation 
The model that we estimate consist on a non-linear system of seven equations that includes 
two demand equations (1), the cost function (6), the pricing equations for loan and deposit 
interest rates (7), the branch equation (8) and the advertising equation (9). 
3.2.1 DEMAND EQUATIONS 
The two demand equations are formulated according to (1) for the case of demand of 
banking services. The demand for each bank depends on the interest rates, the number 
of branches and the advertising stock14
 
: 
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where super-indexes l and d in its refer to loans and deposits, respectively. The expected 
relationship between interest rate and output is negative in the case of loans (αll < 0) and 
positive for deposits (αd > 0). Next, we expect a positive contribution of the number 
of branches and the stock of advertising capital on every output demand (φj, γj > 0; j ∈{l, d}). 
Finally, we have included time dummies to control for a potential cyclicality of the ratio of bank 
products demand to the outside good demand. 
Equations (1.1) and (1.2) define the market shares of loans and deposits for bank i at 
time t. However, there are some issues that need to be addressed to perfectly define the 
extent and scope of the demand faced by each bank: 
Relevant Geographic Market. The range of banks in the consumer’ choice 
gathers the whole population of Spanish banks. Although it may seem more reasonable 
to assume that consumers choose among banks operating in their local geographical 
markets, empirical analysis of the Spanish banking system suggests that the hypothesis of 
a single national market is a reasonable one for the purpose of the paper. First, the concept 
of “local bank” can be blurred in Spain because most of the banks have expanded across 
                                                                            
14. We consider that the indirect utility function depends on the log of the interest rate of loans in order to obtain 
a constant price elasticity that does not depend on the level of the quoted interest rate [see Nevo (2001)]. 
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the 50 Spanish provinces: in 2003, 92.2% of banks operate in more than one province, 
63.8% in more than 5 provinces, 21.6% in more than 25 and 12.8% in 45 provinces or more. 
Second, the average number of banks per province in 2003 was close to 40 (out of 90) 
in 2003 (around 30 in 1988), so even if consumers chose only among local suppliers, the 
latter would represent a large proportion of the national population of banks. In addition, 
Martín-Oliver, Salas and Saurina (2007) provide evidence supporting that Spanish banks 
apply the same pricing policy in all the provinces where they operate and suggest that 
there is no segmentation across geographical regions, what points towards a relatively 
integrated national market. Also, Carbó et al. (2005) estimate price and non-price elasticities 
(interest rates and branches) for Spanish banks distinguishing between separate regional 
markets and a single national market for loans and deposits and they do not find significant 
differences between estimations. 
Relevant consumer and relevant activity. It is assumed in the paper that banks 
heterogeneity lies only on the quoted interest rates and on their non-price attributes; but this 
would be wrong if banks geared their activity to the retail/wholesale business or if they were 
focused on households or firms. In Spain, the latter scenario is not realistic because banks 
are almost exclusively focused on retail banking, and their activity provide services to 
households and firms without any significant specialization15
Size of the potential market. Previous work in the IO literature assumes that the 
potential market for a product or service is equal to the total population of the geographical 
region [Berry et al. (1995) for car markets; Nevo (2001) for ready-to-eat cereal industry]. 
In banking, Adams et al. (2007) consider the potential size of the deposit market to be 
equal to the number of household multiplied by the average number of deposit accounts 
per household. Nonetheless, this measure could be biased if the number of active bank 
accounts that are no longer operative by costumers differs across banks
. 
16. In this paper 
we will assume that the potential size of the market is equal to the sum of the financial 
operations that take place through the banking market and also the non-banking market, 
where no banks are part of the transactions (outside good). To determine the potential size 
of the loan market we have information of the Spanish firms’ balance of banking and 
non-banking loans17
B
NBB
Bl F
FFLM +⋅=
 and we make the assumption that the relation between non-banking 
loans and banking loans available for firms can be extrapolated to the rest of sectors. 
Thus, the potential size can be proxied as , where LB is the total balance 
of banking loans and FB, FNB are the balances of banking and non-banking loans for firms.  
                                                                            
15. The average of the distribution of the weight of loans to households accounts for the 45.85% of the loans granted to 
the private sector in 2003 (the rest are loans to firms), with an standard deviation of 22.8%, being the 10th percentile 
equal to 29.3% and the 90th percentile equal to 82.9%. Among the loans to households, the average of the distribution 
of the weight of mortgages was 58.59%, with a standard distribution of 25.6%, a 10th percentile of 8.9% and a 90th 
percentile of 82.5%. 
16. There might be different incentive policies within banks that penalize employees that close deposit accounts 
of customers and, to avoid it, they maintain the account open, but with no balance and operations. 
17. Information obtained from SABI, a database of balance sheets items of Spanish non-financial firms. 
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For deposits, we take as potential size of the market, Md, the total balance of 
financial assets held by households according to the Spanish Financial Accounts published 
by Banco de España. This approach to estimate the potential market would be in line with 
Dick (2008) and Ishii (2005) that consider non-banking deposits as part of the total potential 
market.18
3.2.2 COST FUNCTION 
 
The second component of the system of equations to be estimated comes from the cost 
function presented in (6): 
( ) citititititKit Dummies TimeDzLzwcC ξκκκ ++++−++= lnlnln1lnln 21,0  (6.1) 
where citξ  is the error component with zero mean. We impose the restriction that the sum 
of the coefficients of the log input prices has to be equal to 1, as derived from the duality 
between the production and the cost function. The values of z1 and z2 give the contribution of 
each component to the aggregate output of the bank and they do not have to be restricted 
to sum up to 1. Appendix B provides an explanation of how the user costs of capital are 
calculated. 
3.2.3 FIRST ORDER CONDITIONS 
The last block of equations to be included in the joint estimation comes from the profit 
maximizing conditions (7), (8) and (9) on interest rates, the stock of branches and the 
stock of advertising capital. The reason to include them in the estimation is twofold: 
first, they guarantee that the coefficients estimated are consistent with the profit-maximizing 
behavior assumed in the model19
it
it
L
Cz1
 and, second, the conditions will be formulated so that 
we can test whether or not the observed values of the decision variables are consistent with 
the profit maximizing behavior. Substituting the expressions for the marginal operating costs 
for loans and deposits from equation (6), and 
it
it
D
Cz2 , and substituting the respective 
price elasticity (2) calculated from the demand equations, the FOC (7) can written as follows: 
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Proceeding in a similar manner the FOC (8) and (9) can be written as: 
                                                                            
18. In order to check the sensitiveness of the results under a change in the measure of M, alternative measures of M 
have been considered and the results presented in this paper did not change significantly. Among them, I considered 
that the banking market was equal to a fixed proportion over time of the whole potential market equal to the average 
number of loans and the number of current accounts over time per household (around 80%). This approach is in 
line with Adams (2007), that obtains the potential size of the deposit market multiplying the number of deposits 
accounts per household and the number of households. The model was estimated considering that the potential 
size was 1/0.8 of the banking market and also 1/0.7 and 1/0.5. As said, the estimated coefficients remain fairly constant. 
19. This procedure is similar to Besanko et al. (1998), that also estimate demand functions imposing the pricing 
equations implied by the Nash equilibrium behavior of firms in the yogurt and catsup market. 
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The intercepts abdl δδδδ ,,, and the residuals ait
b
it
d
it
l
it εεεε ,,,  of the respective 
equations are added to the first order conditions to allow for possible deviation of profit 
maximizing behavior of banks. The equations 7.1, 7.2, 8.1 and 9.1 will be included in the 
estimation and it will return an estimation of the value of the intercepts. The distribution 
of the intercepts will depend on the distribution of the coefficients of the demand and cost 
equations and it will provide a test for the profit maximizing behaviour of banks: if we perform 
a Wald test of statistical significance of the intercepts abdl δδδδ ,,, and it cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the value is non-different from zero, then the hypothesis of profit 
maximization in the choice of the respective decision variable will not be rejected. On the 
other hand, if the test rejects the null hypothesis, it will imply that the observed values of 
the respective decision variable are not consistent with profit maximizing behaviour. 
3.3 Estimation methodology 
The error term of the demand equations includes, among other components, the unobserved 
bank characteristics of loans and deposits. Interest rates ( )ditlit rr ,  are correlated to these 
characteristics ( )ditlit ξξ ,  because, in spite of being unobservable for the researcher, they are 
observable for both banks and consumers (quality of consumer service, reputation, solvency 
and soundness of the bank, etc). This endogeneity biases the OLS coefficient of the interest 
rate in both loans and deposits towards zero, underestimating the own price elasticity. 
The equation of the operating costs can present also potential biases due to endogeneity  
because it includes as regressors the quantity of loans and deposits produced by each bank, 
that are determined jointly with the operating costs. To cope with this problem, the estimation 
will be based on the definition of a set of orthogonality conditions derived from 
the assumption that ξ  is mean independent of some set of exogenous instruments. For the 
estimation of the demand equations, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) provide instruments 
(BLP instruments) that have been generally adopted in the literature. Let z = (zl, zd, zc) be the 
set of instruments to be used, where zl, zd, zc are the instruments for demand of loans, 
demand of deposits and operating costs, respectively. For the demand of loans and deposits, 
we use the same set of instruments (zl = zd), that include the price of the inputs used in 
production (wage of workers, opportunity cost of capital), the average number of branches 
across competitors and the average stock of advertising capital across competitors.20 
Moreover, we also add the average stock of IT capital and the net revenues of commissions 
in zl, zd as cost shifters that will affect the interest rate quoted by the bank. The set 
of instruments for the operating costs equation, zc, contains again the wage of workers, 
the opportunity cost of capital, the average of the wage paid by competitors21
                                                                            
20. Papers that use the BLP instruments also include the observed characteristics of the product in the set of 
instruments. However, in our case these variables are endogenous in the model because they are included in the set 
of decision variables of the banks’ problem (branches and advertising capital) and are left out of the instrument set. 
 and the net 
commissions. Additionally, the stock of advertising capital and the number of branches 
are also added in zc because their cost is not included in the operating cost equation (it only 
includes IT capital and labour expenses), but they are related to the output of the bank 
through the demand side. Finally, zc also contains the number of workers per branch 
21. We also included the average opportunity capital of competitors, but it proved to be highly collinear with the rest of 
instruments. 
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(proxy for the average size of branches) to account for additional banks’ differentiation at the 
branch level in terms of quality of service, variety of services, etc. Summing up, we have a 
set of orthogonality conditions defined from the equations of demand and costs and we add 
the four FOC from the maximization problem of banks (7.1), (7.2), (8.1), (9.1): 
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With the definition of the orthogonality conditions, the two-step GMM estimator is the 
vector { }cdl θθθθ ,,=  that solves the problem 
ΛΛ −1'min NAθ  
where AN is a consistent estimate of ( )'ΛΛE  obtained from a preliminary suboptimal GMM 
estimator where AN=z’z. The overall goodness of the estimations will be evaluated through the 
validity of the moment conditions (Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions). 
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4 Results 
4.1 System of equations: Demand, cost and FOC 
4.1.1 OLS VERSUS IV-GMM 
The results of estimating the system of equations are presented in Table 3. The model 
has been estimated for two different time periods, 1988-1996 and 1997-2003 in order to 
analyze the effects and implications on competition of the integration of Spanish banks 
inside a broader (European) banking market (1997-2003). For each time period, the equations 
of demand, costs and FOC are jointly estimated using the OLS instruments (that is, 
the regressors themselves) and the results (first column) are compared with the instrumented 
two-steps GMM estimations (second column) to evaluate the potential estimation biases 
when the endogeneity of interest rates is not taken into account. In both time periods, 
the effect of the endogeneity is evident in the demand of both loans and deposits, as the 
(absolute) magnitude of the coefficient of interest rate is greater by a factor of four 
in the instrumented GMM estimation compared to the OLS estimation. In the case of 
deposits, the estimated coefficient for the interest rate variable is not even statistically different 
from zero. Finally, the estimates of all the intercepts included in the FOC are significantly 
different from zero at 1% in all the time periods (10% for ab δδ ,  in the first period), what 
can be interpreted as an inconsistency between the results obtained from the estimation and 
the fulfilment of the FOC derived from the model. Therefore, all these findings can be 
interpreted as evidence that the OLS estimation provides biased estimates of the coefficients 
of interest rates and also of the rest of variables. Therefore, the econometrically sound 
estimates are considered to be those obtained from the two-step GMM estimation with 
instruments and, thus, they will be the focus for the rest of the paper. The estimates of both 
time periods satisfy the Sargan test of over identifying restrictions, what guarantees the 
complementarities of the set of moment conditions used in the estimations.22
4.1.2 ESTIMATES OF THE 1988-1996 PERIOD 
 
The estimates of the 1988-1996 period show that the demands of loans and deposits are 
significantly associated to the interest rate paid by the bank in the expected direction, that is, 
the demand of loans is negatively related to the price whereas the demand of deposits 
increases with the interest rate. 
The contribution of the value-enhancing demand resources, i.e. branches and 
advertising capital, is positive and significant in loans and deposits, what confirms 
that banking products are differentiated across entities because the demand of loans and 
deposits increases with the stock of advertising capital and with the size of the branch 
network, for a given interest rate. 
The estimates of the cost function show that the output of banks is made out by the 
product of the balance of loans and deposits with exponential weights of 0.42 and 0.56, 
respectively. This output is produced in the physical space provided by homogeneous 
branches with a production technology that combines labour, with a weight of 0.67, and IT 
                                                                            
22. The results of the estimations are similar if the demand equations include fixed effects of banks (not shown), though 
advertising become non-significative in the demand of loans and branches are non-significative in the demand 
of deposits. 
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capital, with a weight of 0.33 (this value is not statistically significant probably due to the low 
variation of the user cost of IT capital across banks). 
The bottom part of Table 3 shows the p-values from the test of statistical significance 
of the intercepts abdl δδδδ ,,,  from (7.1), (7.2), (8.1) and (9.1). The null hypothesis that 
each of these average residuals is equal to zero cannot be rejected except in the case 
of loans. This result would imply that banks did not set interest rates according to the 
profit-maximizing conditions derived from the model. One possible explanation is related to 
the high levels and high volatility of the estimates of the risk premium of loans. Notice that, 
in the estimation of the marginal cost of loans, it is assumed that the risk premium for the new 
loans in year t is calculated from the expected loss of the current bank’s loan portfolio. 
However, the credit risk perceived by the banks for new loans in t might have differed from 
the risk perceived when the loans in the portfolio were granted. This decoupling between the 
perceived credit risk for the new loans and the average risk of the existing credit portfolio 
is more likely to occur in periods of abrupt changes in the macro economic conditions, as it 
happened when Spain suffered a serious recession in the early nineties23
4.1.3 CHANGES IN ESTIMATES BETWEEN PERIODS 
. Moreover, 
the interbank market was not fully developed in this period, what led banks in many cases 
to cross subsidize from deposits to loans markets. 
Table 3 also presents the results of the estimation for the 1997-2003 period. The null 
hypothesis of structural stability of the model in the two time periods is tested using the 
distribution of coefficients obtained from 1,000 bootstrap replications of the two-step GMM 
coefficients performed for each time period. The results of the test (not shown) individually 
and jointly reject for all the coefficients the null hypothesis of no-significant difference 
between the two time periods, at a significance level of 5%. Therefore, all the differences and 
comparisons between the two time periods that will be commented below refer to statistically 
significant differences explained by the structural changes underwent by the Spanish banking 
sector. 
The estimated coefficient of the loan interest rate in 1997-2003 has halved with 
respect to the first period (absolute value fell to 5.29 compared to 10.88), whereas 
the coefficient of the deposit interest rate has risen from 4.50 to 6.85. The contribution 
of the number of branches to product differentiation has decreased in both the demand of 
loans and deposits, as the estimated coefficients have declined from 0.74 to 0.62 in loans 
and from 0.48 to 0.32 in deposits. On the other hand, the coefficients of advertising 
capital have increased from 0.15 to 0.28 in loans and from 0.51 to 0.65 in deposits. 
The decline of the contribution of the number of and the increase of the contribution 
of advertising capital may indicate that “proximity banking” may lose weight in the choice of 
bank costumers in favour of distant or internet mediated banking, which is heavily intensive 
in advertising. 
The estimated elasticities of the output of banks to labour and IT capital derived from 
the production/ cost function remain relatively stable over time, although the increase in the 
                                                                            
23. Robustness tests have been performed on this result by using alternative calculations of the risk premium, from the 
zero-risk premium scenario to premiums based on forward looking estimates of the default losses. In all cases, 
the changes in the estimated coefficients of the model concentrate in the estimated value of the intercept of the FOC of 
loans and of the coefficient of the interest rate of loans. Therefore, it can be concluded that, except for the estimated 
elasticity of demand for loans, the rest of the estimates appear robust to different hypothesis about how banks actually 
determine the risk premium for their loans in the first time period. 
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elasticity of output to IT capital in the second period, from 0.33 to 0.37, suggests that 
the production technology of banking services has become slightly more intensive in IT 
capital at the expense of labour services.24
The test of statistical significance of the intercepts 
 The sum of the estimated weights of loans and 
deposits in the total output of banks is equal in the two time periods and close to one (0.98). 
However the weight of deposits increased from 0.56 to 0.62 and the weight of loans 
decreased from 0.42 to 0.36. This implies that the relative increase in the operating 
costs derived from the increment of 1pp in the volume of deposits is higher than the relative 
increase derived from the same increment in the volume of loans, and that the magnitude of 
these differences has increased over time. 
abdl δδδδ ,,,  from the 
profit-maximizing condition is not rejected for any of the decision variables of banks for 
the 1997-2003 period. Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that banks have made 
lending decisions with more accurate estimates of the credit risks of the borrowers, 
probably helped by the technical advances in measuring and tracking credit risks. As well, 
the development of the interbank market has contributed to separate loans and deposits 
pricing decisions, as it assumed by the theoretical model, 
4.2 Own and cross elasticities of the demand of loans and deposits 
Table 4 presents the own and cross elasticities of the Loans and Deposits demand 
functions to the interest rates and value-enhancing resources (branches and advertising 
capital). The elasticities are calculated for the representative bank25
The own price elasticities of demand for loans and deposits in the 1988-1996 period 
are -10.82 (10.88·0.995) and 4.47 (4.50·0.995) respectively. Taking into account equations 
(7.1) and (7.2) the price elasticity imply a relative gross margin (Lerner index) of 9.2% in the 
market of loans and a relative gross margin of 22.3% in the market of deposits. The finite 
price elasticity of demand implies that banks can set interest rates above the marginal costs 
in both loans and deposits markets, i.e., banks have market power. In the time period 
1997-2003, the estimated price elasticity for the demand of loans is lower in absolute value 
than in the previous period (-5.26) while the price elasticity of the demand of deposits is 
higher (6.61). These values imply a relative gross margin in loans of 19.0% and a relative 
gross margin in deposits of 22.3%, The gross relative margins of loans and deposits are now 
more similar than they were in the previous period and their evolution implies that, in EMU, 
Spanish banks increased their market power in loans and decreased their market power 
in deposits. 
 from the estimates shown 
in Table 3 using the expressions of elasticities in (2) derived from the discrete-choice model. 
The estimated own and cross price elasticity in the period 1997-2003 imply 
that if the representative bank i increased its loan interest rate in one percentage point 
in the 1997-2003 period, its relative demand fell by 5.26% in favour of its competitors, 
whose individual demand rose by an average of 0.026%. Taking into account that there 
was an average of 95 banks in the period, the total increase in the demand of loans 
for the rest of banks is 2.47%. The rest of the demand decrease of bank i (2.79%) went to the 
outside good, that is, consumers that switch to non-banking markets. In the deposit side, 
                                                                            
24. Martín-Oliver and Salas-Fumás also report an increase of the intensity of IT capital in the production function of 
Spanish banks and find that an additional investment in IT of one million euros may be substituted for twenty-five 
workers. 
25. The market share of the representative bank is assumed to be 0.5% (average market share of loans and 
deposits in 2003 is 0.43%). Notice that the market share is computed taking into account the potential market, that is, 
the denominator includes the purchases of all banking and non-banking (outside good) products. 
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an increase of the interest rate in 1 percentage point raised the demand by 6.62% from the 
transfer of the demand of competitors, which lose an average of 0.033% of their demand 
(3.13% for the aggregate demand of the 95 competitors), and from consumers of the outside 
good (3.48%). 
The price elasticities for deposits and loans estimated in this paper are in line with 
the elasticity estimates reported in other papers, though slightly higher: for bank deposits, 
Ishii (2005) obtains a price elasticity of 4.20; the deposit rate elasticities across MSA in the US 
have a median value of 3.47 in Adams (2007); Dick (2008) reports a price elasticity for 
bank deposits of 2.99. For the case of loans, Ho (2010) estimates a price elasticity 
equal to -1.6 for the banks in Hong Kong. The reason why our elasticities are higher could be 
twofold: First, the interest rates used in this paper are those paid/charged to the new 
deposits/loans granted during the year t (marginal interest rates), while the elasticity estimates 
of the above-mentioned papers are obtained using interest rates calculated as the ratio 
between the interest expenses/revenues and the stock of deposits/loans at the end of 
the period (average interest rates). Second, the price elasticities estimated in this paper are 
drawn from the joint estimation of the equations of demand and cost and profit-maximizing 
conditions and they are computed introducing for the first time the risk premium in 
the price equation. This implies that price elasticities have to be equal to the inverse of the 
relative margin net of operating costs and risk premium (see footnote 13) what might 
increase their absolute value compared to other papers that did not include the price 
equations [Adams (2007); Dick (2008)] or that did not explicitly considered the loans risk 
premium [Ho (2010)]. Moreover, the inclusion of the cost function in the empirical 
model guarantees that the estimated coefficients of the cost function will fit the data on 
total operating costs. As these coefficients also appear in the first order conditions, the 
estimated elasticities of this paper are subject to further restrictions than if the cost 
parameters are estimated only with the condition of price equal to marginal cost [Ishii (2010); 
Ho (2010)]. 
Table 4 also shows the estimates of the elasticities of loans and deposits to changes 
in the number of branches and to changes in the stock of advertising. For the representative 
bank, an increase of 1% in the number of branches raises the relative share of the bank in 
the loans market by 0.62%. This increase is the result of a loss of 0.003% in the market share 
of each competitor (aggregated loss of 0.29% for all the competitors) and the loss in market 
share of the outside good (non-banking alternatives). For deposits, a 1% increase in the 
number of branches raises the market share of the representative bank in 0.32%, that is a 
half of the increase in the loans market. On the other hand, if the bank increases the stock 
of advertising capital in 1%, then the gains of market share in the loans and in the deposits 
markets would be 0.28% and 0.65%, respectively. Therefore, the results suggest that a 
branch’ expansion is more effective than an increase in advertising expenditures to gain 
market share in the loans market while advertising capital is more effective than branches 
in the deposit market. 
Table 4 also shows the marginal gross return from investment in advertising and in 
the number of branches, calculated according to the right hand side of equations (8.1) and 
(9.1). In the period 1988-1996, the marginal gross profit margin of one euro spent in branches 
was 0.089 euros (0.032 originated in the loans market plus 0.057 originated in the deposits 
market). During the period 1997-2003, the marginal gross profit from one additional euro 
invested in branches decreased slightly to 0.081 euros and the largest contribution came 
from the loans market (0.056 versus 0.025 in the deposits market). The marginal gross profit 
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for advertising increased over time from 0.067 in 1988-1996 to 0.076 in 1997-2003. In both 
time periods, the contribution to this profit is higher in the deposits market than in the loans 
market, though in the later it has increased over time. 
The increasing returns from advertising capital, combined with the higher weight of IT 
capital, and the smaller returns derived from the number of branches suggest that banks 
have evolved towards a new type of banking where intangibles gain importance over physical 
assets as competition tools. In other words, the traditional proximity banking based on 
a wide branch network to be close to the customer is evolving towards a distant banking, 
where internet and advertising are becoming the core variables of banking competition. 
4.3 Simulation 
In this section, we use the estimations of the demand and cost functions to simulate the 
optimal decisions of the representative bank that maximizes profits in response to changes of 
the exogenous variables. The target is to shed light on how banks will react (modifying quoted 
interest rates, optimal size, etc) in response to changes of exogenous factors, as monetary 
policy, input prices, etc. As this exercise predicts the reaction of banks due to changes 
of the conditions that define the playing field of competition, it can represent an interesting 
tool for policy makers in order to assess the potential implications for the banking system of a 
decision they make (i.e. changes in the monetary policy). 
The simulation exercise is performed using the four FOC in (7.1), (7.2), (8.1), (9.1) and 
the value of the coefficients of Table 3 corresponding to the 1997-2003 period. Given the 
values of the exogenous variables, we can solve for the four unknowns in the FOC and obtain 
the optimal value of the decision variables of banks under those conditions. The exogenous 
variables are the interbank interest rate ibtr , the opportunity cost of equity, 
o
itc , salaries, w, 
the amount of investment in physical capital needed to open a branch, kb, the credit risk 
premium, rpit and the potential market of loans and deposits, Ml, Md. On the other hand, 
the endogenous or decision variables are the loan interest rate litr , the deposit interest rate, 
d
itr , the number of branches, Bit, and the advertising capital, CKit. Once we have solved 
for them, we can determine the demand of loans and deposits, the operating costs and total 
costs, the net income and the ROE. 
This section presents two simulation exercises that respond to two different 
questions. The first exercise aims to assess the impact of an external shock coming from 
a change in the monetary conditions. The second exercise measures the reaction of a bank 
under a price change of one of its inputs. As the exogenous variables are set at their 
median values in both exercises, the optimal responses that are predicted can be attributed 
to the representative bank26
The first exercise simulates the decline of 1 percentage point of the 1-year interbank 
interest rate, from 5.3% (approx. value in 1997) to 4.4% (value in 2001). As the 
interbank interest rate decreases, so does the profit maximizing interest rates of loans 
. Notice that the predictions of the endogenous variables refer to 
long-term equilibrium decisions as a response to a permanent variation of the monetary policy 
and a permanent variation of the input prices, when all the adjustments in the transition are 
completed. 
                                                                            
26. In order to assess the validity of the simulations, we have replicated the evolution of the exogenous variables 
during 1997-2003 and we have compared the expected behavior of the median bank with the real variables of a 
representative bank in the sample. The predicted trends are in line with the real behavior of the representative bank, 
though the variations are larger because the model does not contemplate the existence of adjustment costs. 
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and deposits (Figure 1a). The absolute gross margin with respect to the interbank rate 
remains rather stable and is higher in loans than in deposits due to the embedded 
0.8 percentage points that correspond to the risk premium. 
As loan and deposit interest rates decrease, the demand of loans increase and the 
demand of deposits decrease. At the same time, the profit-maximizing conditions vary in such 
a way that loans become more profitable and it is optimal to increase the optimal 
stock of advertising tied to loans and to increase the number of branches. However, the drop 
of the interest rate acts in the opposite direction on the deposit side. The production inputs 
(labour and IT) are adapted at every point to meet the demand of banking services. Adding up 
the effects, Figure 1b shows that, for representative bank, the deposit effect dominates 
and banks decrease their size until the interbank rate reaches 4.9%. For further reductions, 
the loan effect outweighs the deposit effect and it is optimal to increase the stock of 
advertising capital and number of branches. This inflection point will obviously vary depending 
on the conditions assumed in the exercise and determined by the value of the rest of 
exogenous variables. 
As the interbank decreases, Figure 1c documents a gap between the stock 
of loans and deposits that becomes larger for lower levels of the reference rate. This is 
consistent with the actual evolution of loans and deposits in Spain during the years prior 
to the 2007 crisis, when the reference rates were unusually low. Finally, Figure 1d presents 
the revenues and costs that result from the optimization and Figure 1e shows the economic 
profit normalized per Euro of equity27
Figure 2 presents the results of the second exercise that simulates a rise of the 
opportunity cost of capital from 9.3% to 10.5%. This scenario could be understood 
as the isolation of the price effect embedded in the tightening of the standards to access to 
funds as a result of a potential collapse of the money market. 
. It presents a slight negative trend, but the values 
remain above zero. 
The changes in the opportunity cost of equity leave practically unchanged the profit 
maximizing interest rates of loans and deposits since such cost only marginally affects the 
operating cost through the user cost of IT capital (Figure 2a). The main induced changes 
affect the costs of the value-enhancing resources that become higher as the opportunity 
cost of equity increases. For this reason, the optimal levels of the stock of advertising and 
branches decrease (Figure 2b), which in turn decrease the demand of all banking services 
at a very similar pace (Figure 2c). On the production side, the decrease in the demand 
reduces the use of labour and IT capital. However, higher levels of the cost of equity increase 
the user’s cost of IT capital and, therefore, IT capital will be partly substituted by the labour as 
a production input (not shown). Finally, the fall in banking activity due to the higher cost of 
equity implies lower revenues and lower total costs (Figure 2d) that result in positive values 
of the ROE around values of 2%, what implies that the representative bank adapts its size 
and production to maintain constant levels of economic profits. 
                                                                            
27. The level of equity has been computed for every scenario as the 8% of the total assets, assuming that the level of 
capital is the minimum required by Basel I, an assumption we also make in the formulation of the theoretical model 
of profit maximization, see footnote 6. 
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5 Conclusions 
The creation of the EMU has increased banking integration in Europe and, for countries 
like Spain, it has meant a substantial reduction in the official interest rates compared 
with the pre Euro period. This paper documents the change in the competitive conditions 
of the Spanish banking industry during the period in which Spain prepared and finally 
joined the EMU. The analysis is focused on both price and non-price competition variables. 
The paper provides estimates of the elasticity of the demand of loans and deposits for price, 
advertising capital and number of branches, where the demand function is derived from 
a multiple-choice model of consumers’ behavior with differentiated products. It also provides 
estimates of the elasticity of operating cost to the quantity of inputs (labor and IT capital) 
and to the quantity of loans and deposits. All these elasticities are obtained as part of a 
joint estimation process that includes, in addition to the cost and demand functions, 
the profit-maximizing conditions from banks. The inferences of changes in the competitive 
conditions of the Spanish banking industry are made by comparing the elasticity in the 
more recent time period and the elasticity in the period before. 
The paper finds that when Spain becomes a member of the EMU, the representative 
bank faces a more price-elastic demand for deposits and a less price-elastic demand 
for loans. Then, the conclusion is that market power of Spanish banks has lowered in the 
deposits market and it may have increased in the loans market as a result of becoming part 
of the Euro zone. Nonetheless, the empirical analysis casts doubts that interest rates of loans 
satisfied the profit-maximizing conditions in the pre-Euro period. The paper reports a change 
in the value of the Lerner index (consistent with the estimated elasticity) of the representative 
bank from 22.3% (9.2%) in deposits (loans) during the period previous to the EMU to 15.1% 
(19%) in the EMU period. In the production side, banks have become more efficient in 
production in the EMU period, as the marginal operating costs of deposits (loans) has fallen 
from a value of 1.2 (2.2) cents in the first part of the time period to 0.8 (1.1) cents of euro 
in the second part. The reduction in operating costs coincides with a trend of increasing 
substitution of IT capital in the place of workers to produce banking services: the stock of IT 
per worker increased from an average of 10.54 thousands of constant Euros of 1983 during 
the first time period to an average of 16.81 during the second. 
As regards non-price competition variables, the paper finds an increase in the gross 
marginal return for Advertising capital and a decrease in the gross marginal return for 
Branches during the EMU period, compared with the values of marginal returns in the years 
before. The changes in marginal returns are in part the result of an increase in the elasticity of 
the demand to Advertising capital (especially in loans) and a decrease in the elasticity 
of the demand to Branches. The relative shift from branches to advertising as a differentiation 
variable for the representative Spanish bank is interpreted in the paper as evidence that 
retail banking in Spain is evolving from a business model of proximity banking (with a dense 
network of physical branches) to a model of distant banking (with telephone and internet 
supported transactions). 
The simulated values of the endogenous variables of the model to changes in the 
interbank rate provide results that are consistent with the actual evolution of these variables. 
In particular, it documents the gap between loans and deposits for the representative bank 
when interest rates become particularly low in the second part of the period. The gap has 
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been filled mainly with funds supplied by foreign banks belonging to the Euro system, 
something that has been possible because Spain was part of the system. 
One possible limitation of the paper is the consideration of the national market 
as the relevant market instead of regional or local markets, the assumption that the choice 
of the number of branches and stock of advertising capital is made without taking into 
account adjustment costs and the assumption of homogeneity between the two types 
of banks in Spain, commercial and savings banks. These caveats should be considered in 
future research. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the output components and market shares of banks, m€ y % 
N Average P25 P50 P75 Average P25 P50 P75 Average P25 P50 P75 Average P25 P50 P75
151 595.7 97.0 224.0 435.8 0.259 0.041 0.098 0.194 857.3 153.8 342.6 757.3 0.356 0.054 0.143 0.321
143 678.9 122.7 251.9 544.7 0.258 0.040 0.089 0.192 982.1 182.4 387.8 868.5 0.360 0.048 0.137 0.305
130 726.6 132.1 265.1 535.2 0.267 0.033 0.091 0.203 985.6 132.5 383.6 839.6 0.391 0.041 0.145 0.316
128 903.5 155.8 320.6 684.2 0.269 0.031 0.094 0.200 1,181 167.4 443.7 1,004 0.402 0.031 0.142 0.318
125 855.9 145.2 311.9 712.0 0.264 0.029 0.086 0.210 1,139 134.5 440.2 1,007 0.403 0.025 0.144 0.316
126 972.8 123.2 312.4 853.3 0.254 0.028 0.081 0.196 1,333 125.2 461.9 1,130 0.400 0.033 0.131 0.339
122 1,021 140.5 377.3 862.1 0.289 0.030 0.093 0.243 1,432 176.4 499.4 1,258 0.412 0.039 0.143 0.375
119 1,074 144.2 417.3 1,007.8 0.298 0.032 0.095 0.257 1,566 200.2 523.6 1,327 0.400 0.031 0.124 0.354
114 1,184 153.7 458.2 1,094.0 0.312 0.035 0.105 0.274 1,668 218.4 647.6 1,357 0.408 0.036 0.139 0.350
113 1,342 182.5 541.7 1,161.5 0.316 0.033 0.108 0.282 1,766 273.7 655.4 1,511 0.395 0.032 0.135 0.353
108 1,506 210.5 605.5 1,331.6 0.329 0.034 0.106 0.271 1,819 255.7 723.7 1,546 0.417 0.044 0.139 0.348
103 1,875 244.0 686.1 1,566.6 0.344 0.035 0.111 0.288 2,196 271.4 899.7 1,776 0.418 0.041 0.133 0.343
91 2,406 354.3 862.0 1,868.3 0.366 0.030 0.116 0.298 2,719 393.8 1,033 2,260 0.435 0.037 0.136 0.359
88 2,661 378.8 999.1 2,090.7 0.376 0.034 0.131 0.305 3,008 377.1 1,147 2,418 0.465 0.045 0.163 0.405
85 2,955 542.6 1,130.1 2,497 0.397 0.038 0.142 0.340 3,276 437.2 1,310 2,670 0.476 0.054 0.179 0.413
80 3,463 616.3 1,346.0 2,854 0.426 0.041 0.151 0.381 3,752 605.3 1,548 3,093 0.503 0.059 0.188 0.453
Acumulative growth
-3.51% 8.58% 5.75% 8.95% 11.50% 2.29% -1.95% 0.92% 4.32% 8.32% 4.38% 7.96% 7.29% 1.71% -4.92% -0.41% 1.07%
-5.76% 15.80% 20.29% 15.17% 14.99% 4.96% 3.86% 5.54% 5.01% 12.56% 13.23% 14.33% 11.94% 4.05% 10.24% 5.53% 4.15%
Loans Market Share Loans Deposits Market Share Deposits
Note: Stocks of loans and deposits at constant Euros of 1983. N refers to the number of banks in the sample. Market shares are computed in terms of the potential market, as explained in Section 
3.2.1 and they are expressed in percentages, Average is the average value of the distribution and P25, P50, P75, correspond to the value of the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile, respectively, of the 
variable and Total stands for the sum of the output of all the banks in the sample. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables
Average P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 Std. Dev. Average Growth
1988-1996 1,711 89 268 658 1,473 3,514 3,401 3.89%
1997-2003 2,258 138 379 934 2,124 4,718 4,418 5.06%
1988-1996 18,322 740 2,267 6,800 16,665 39,284 36,759 11.06%
1997-2003 41,042 1,343 4,665 15,530 30,892 85,397 96,423 11.62%
1988-1996 234 7 40 110 211 500 415 5.54%
1997-2003 359 13 69 166 342 798 645 6.06%
1988-1996 3,756 73 295 1,386 3,728 8,667 7,308 8.25%
1997-2003 5,402 180 464 2,186 5,287 11,787 10,608 2.51%
1988-1996 15.22 11.47 13.50 15.63 17.09 18.18 2.53 -3.60%
1997-2003 7.30 5.22 6.16 7.29 8.37 9.30 1.62 -4.94%
1988-1996 7.80 5.52 6.39 7.92 9.09 9.90 1.68 -4.68%
1997-2003 2.56 1.67 1.99 2.49 3.04 3.63 0.76 -11.99%
1988-1996 11.72 7.36 10.00 11.81 13.31 15.44 2.81 -6.04%
1997-2003 3.86 2.35 3.16 4.01 4.77 5.20 0.97 -11.50%
1988-1996 2.47 0.57 1.31 2.12 3.36 4.61 1.73 -0.59%
1997-2003 0.94 0.28 0.51 0.84 1.15 1.72 0.73 -7.67%
1988-1996 41,604 2,146 5,924 13,344 31,933 82,051 91,473 5.22%
1997-2003 74,436 3,141 8,372 22,991 59,330 109,978 217,466 10.14%
1988-1996 13.85 11.66 12.64 13.71 15.32 16.08 1.58 -0.63%
1997-2003 10.05 7.64 8.59 10.24 11.08 12.26 1.73 -1.16%
1988-1996 16.72 14.31 14.87 15.91 18.87 19.79 2.19 -0.62%
1997-2003 16.91 13.97 14.20 15.52 20.26 22.20 3.19 0.02%
N. Workers
IT capital
N. Branches
Advertising Capital
Loan Interest Rate
Deposit Interest Rate
Risk Premium
Operating Costs
User Cost of Capital
Wage
Interbank Interest Rate
Note: Number of workers and number of branches are expressed in units. IT capital, Advertising capital, Operating costs and wages areexpressed in thousands of Euros of 1983. User cost of capitalis the 
nominal cost of equity plus the depreciation rate and less the growth rate of the asset’s price. Average is the average value of the distribution and P10, P25, P50, P75, P90 correspond to the value 90th 
percentile, respectively, of the variable. Average growth refers to the average growth of the yearly average of the variable.
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Table 3: Estimation of the Demand and Cost Functions
t-ratio t-ratio p-value t-ratio
DEMAND OF LOANS
r l -1.24 *** -7.18 -5.29 *** -4.79 -2.44 *** -8.65 -10.88 *** -6.53
Branches 0.50 *** 10.94 0.62 *** 5.41 0.50 *** 11.75 0.74 *** 10.50
Advertising 0.34 *** 9.42 0.28 *** 3.04 0.27 *** 9.53 0.15 ** 2.43
DEMAND OF DEPOSITS  
r d 0.37 1.25 6.65 *** 3.12 0.30 1.42 4.50 *** 5.14
Branches 0.40 *** 8.20 0.32 *** 3.15 0.55 *** 17.10 0.48 *** 10.30
Advertising 0.49 *** 13.38 0.65 *** 6.52 0.37 *** 15.58 0.51 *** 13.06
COST FUNCTION
c K 0.34 0.86 0.37 0.54 0.29 1.15 0.33 0.69
w 0.66 *** 7.07 0.63 *** 5.08 0.71 *** 8.83 0.67 *** 6.37
ln Loans 0.44 *** 7.91 0.36 * 1.93 0.38 *** 10.58 0.42 *** 8.11
ln Deposits 0.60 *** 11.69 0.62 *** 3.76 0.55 *** 15.10 0.56 *** 11.77
PROFIT-MAX RESTRICTIONS
l -0.17 *** 2.72 0.03 0.32 0.45 *** 8.66 0.14 *** 6.34
d -0.23 *** 3.29 0.30 1.53 3.10 *** 3.72 -0.02 -0.40
b -0.31 *** 4.56 -0.02 -0.63 1.06 * 1.70 0.01 0.61
a -0.41 *** 4.05 0.06 1.47 0.74 * 1.68 0.06 1.47
Time Dummy variables
N.Obs.
Sargan test (p -value) -
1997-2003
OLS GMM-IV
Coefficient
668
-
OLS
1988-1996
GMM-IV
Coefficient
Yes
1158
Yes
1158
0.143
Coefficient
0.186
Coefficient
668
Yes Yes
(*)=significant at 10% (**)= significant at 5%  (***)= significant at 1%.
Note: The dependent variable of the equations Demand of Loans and Demand of Deposits are the share of loans and deposits, 
respectively and the dependent variable of Cost Function is the log of the operating costs of the bank. Branches and Adverti-
sing refer to the number of branches and advertising capital (thousands of constant Euros) deployed by the bank; rl, rd stand 
for interest rate of loans and deposits. cK and w stand for the user cost of capital and wage in constant Euros, respectively. ln 
Loans, ln Deposits, refer to the log of the balance in thousands of constant Euros of loans and deposits. Finally, we provide the 
estimation of the intercepts of the profit-maximizing equations in (7.1), (7.2), (8.1), (9.1), δl, δd, δb, δa, that are meant to be statisti-
cally non-different from zero if banks are maximizing profits. The Sargan statistic tests the consistency of the orthogonallity 
conditions used in the estimation, as the number of orthogo-nallity conditions is greater than the number of parameters to be 
estimated (r > k). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 35 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1008 
Table 4: Elasticities of Demand, Gross Marginal Returns and Marginal Costs 
1988-1996 1997-2003 1988-1996 1997-2003
ELASTICITIES
Own -10.826 -5.264 4.478 6.617
Cross 0.054 0.026 -0.023 -0.033
Own 0.736 0.617 0.478 0.318
Cross -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
Own 0.149 0.279 0.507 0.647
Cross -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003
Gross Marginal Return BRANCHES 0.032 0.056 0.057 0.025
Gross Marginal Return ADVERTISING 0.006 0.026 0.061 0.050
MARGINAL COST 0.022 0.011 0.012 0.008
LERNER INDEX 0.092 0.190 0.223 0.151
Interest Rates
LOANS
Branches
Advertising
DEPOSITS
The first six rows of the table refer to the own and cross elasticities of interest rates, number of branches and advertising 
capital for Loans, Deposits and Commissions. Elasticities have been computed for a bank with a market share sj of 0.5%. The 
rows Marginal revenue BRANCHES / ADVERTISING are calculated from equations (8.1) and (9.1) using the estimated 
coefficients from Table 3 and the median weights in data of loan and deposit. They show the marginal gross revenues from 
capital services provided by branches and advertising capital, which in the optimal solution are also equal to the respective 
share of service costs of the respective capital input over total revenues of the bank. The last two rows present the attributed 
marginal cost and the lerner index implied by the average prices and costs. More concretely, MARGINAL COST reflects the 
marginal operating derived from the cost function in (6.1) calculated from the estimations of Table 3 and the data. Lerner Index 
is the relative margin per Euro net of marginal costs of the respective output component that is equivalent to the inverse of the 
price elasticity (Equation 7.1 and 7.2). 
B
A
N
C
O
 D
E E
S
P
A
Ñ
A 
36 
D
O
C
U
M
E
N
TO
 D
E
 T
R
A
B
A
JO
 N
.º 1008 
 
Figure 1: Simulation of a fall in the interbank interest rate.
Figure 2: Simulation of a rise in the opportunity cost of capital.  
Note: Both figures represent the optimal behavior of the representative bank under the model of 1997-2003. Loan and deposit incomes are net of the interbank and risk; for loans, (rl-m)·L and for deposits, (rt-rd)·D.  
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APPENDIX 
A. Derivation of the First Order Conditions of the profit-maximizing problem 
In the model, each of the N banks of the market maximizes its profits playing a game in which 
each bank expects their competitors not to respond to changes in its decision variables. 
The necessary conditions for the Nash equilibrium of this game will be determined by the set 
of FOCs obtained from the profit maximization with respect to the banks’ decision variables. 
Solving the problem with respect to the interest rates of loans (assuming 0=
∂
∂
kt
jt
r
r ): 
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That is the FOC (7) for loans. The other FOC in (7) for the deposit interest rate is 
straightforward. The second set of optimality conditions that jointly with (7) determine the 
Nash equilibrium of the game refer to the optimal expenditures on advertising capital (CKit) 
and the number of branches (Bit) If we maximize the profits with respect to branches: 
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From (4), we know that
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where ldd
it
d
it
d
it
l
it
d
it
l
it
l vv  DrLr
Lrv −=
+
= 1; . Following this latter derivation, obtaining the FOC for 
advertising capital is straightforward. 
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B. Methodology used to estimate the stock of material and immaterial assets and 
the user cost of capital 
 
For each bank, data are available on the year-by-year investment flow in Physical assets, 
Advertising and IT. Data are obtained from confidential accounting statements reported by 
banks to the Banco de España. The stock of a particular asset in year t, at current 
replacement cost, is obtained applying the permanent inventory method. 
Let It be the gross investment flow of new capital services in year t; Kt the stock of 
homogeneous capital services at the end of year t; φ the depreciation rate of the asset used in 
production activities during a one-year period; µ the rate of technological progress 
incorporated into capital services invested during one year, with respect to those invested 
one year before, and let qt be the price of one unit of services in period t. The permanent 
inventory method determines the replacement cost of the stock in year t as follows, 
 
( )11
11
1
−−
−
⋅⋅⋅
+
−
+= tt
t
t
tttt Kpp
pIpKp
µ
φ
 
To replace in t one unit of capital service in place at the end of the previous year, t-1, 
with the technical progress in capital goods of the period, only 1/(1+µ) units are needed. 
Depreciation implies that for each unit of capital in place in t-1, there is only (1-φ) units 
remaining at the end of the year. This computation of the net capital services is exact when 
the depreciation of the asset is exponential at rate φ. 
The term (1-φ)/(1+µ) is substituted by (1-δ) where δ is the overall economic 
depreciation rate. The value of δ  is set to 0.03 for buildings, 0.15 for fixed assets different 
from IT, 0.35 for IT capital, and 0.35 for advertising capital. These are values in line with 
others used in the literature. The price index of buildings is taken from the Housing Ministry 
(Ministerio de la Vivenda) and the price index of other non-IT fixed capital is set equal to the 
price deflator of gross capital formation. We assume that the price index of quality-adjusted IT 
capital is zero, and the price index of advertising capital is the price of market services 
published by the Spanish Institute of Statistics. The zero inflation rate of the price of IT capital 
services departs from the 15% to 20% decline assumed in other studies with US data, 
Litchenberg (1995), because, in Spain, general inflation is much higher than in the US, and 
technological innovations are introduced at a later time. 
The user cost of capital represents the rental price per unit of service the firm would 
pay in the case that the unit of service was rented in the market. Even though capital services 
are supplied internally, we assume that there is an opportunity cost for one unit of service 
equal to the rental price. For capital service K, the user cost is given by ( )kok pcc −+= δ , 
where co is the financial opportunity cost of capital, δ is the depreciation rate defined earlier, 
and kp  is the rate of change in price of the asset during the period (asset-specific inflation). 
The calculation of the user cost of capital requires us to know co. Since the paper assumes 
that material and immaterial operating assets are financed by equity, the estimated cost of co 
is set equal to the estimated cost of equity for each bank. This, in turn, is set equal to the 
interest rate charged for loans by the bank, plus a financial risk premium that is inversely 
related to the proportion of capital to total assets of the bank. 
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For a more detailed explanation of the methodology for both, replacement costs of 
invested assets, and user cost of capital, see Martin-Oliver, Salas-Fumás and Saurina (2007). 
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